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Trade liberalisation in the livestock sector is not likely to benefit to any great degree from
the trade negotiations on agriculture at the WTO that commenced in the spring of 2000. This
is because the major barriers to trade in livestock and red meat are not related to tariffs and
other traditional border measures that restrict trade or subsidisation; rather, they are gov-
erned by the WTO’s SPS Agreement and the GATT’s contingency protection provisions
relating to dumping and countervailing duties. Negotiations on these issues will have to
await a general WTO negotiating round. As SPS and contingency protection questions have
many interested sectors, progress is likely to be slow and the prospects for further formal lib-
eralisation remote in the near future. In these circumstances, private sector initiatives to
defuse trade problems before they start is a strategy that should be continued and expanded.1
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
I
nternational trade issues pertaining to the Canadian red meat industries tend to increase
in prominence and then fade from view. The beginning of the new millennium has been
one of the quieter times. Trade disputes involving Canadian livestock products have not
been making the headlines and neither those who represent the Canadian livestock indus-
tries in trade matters, nor government officials, are operating in crisis mode. This does not
mean trade problems in the livestock sector have disappeared. In fact a surprising number
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to be dealt with in the near term either through private discussions (e.g., between the
Canadian Cattlemen’s Association (CCA) and the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association
(NCBA) in the United States), in the international dispute systems available to Canada (i.e.,
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement), or
in new international negotiations. One of the things that the NAFTA experience has taught
the Canadian private sector is the importance of building good relationships on trade issues
with producer groups or other organisations in foreign countries—particularly in the United
States given Canada’s heavy dependence on its market. It has become abundantly clear over
the last few years that neither the NAFTA nor the WTO can be relied upon to solve all the
issues in livestock trade and that building private relationships is increasingly important.
While the North American livestock markets are becoming increasingly integrated eco-
nomically, producer organisations remain national in membership and focus. As a result,
instead of a common approach to problems in the market, traditional protectionism based
on producer lobbying and nationalism remains the norm (Young, 2000).
While the focus of trade problems in the red meat sectors tends to centre on the U.S.
market, a large number of international issues are important for the Canadian industry.
These issues relate both to better access to foreign markets for Canadian products and
access to the Canadian market for offshore products. In the case of the former, the ongoing
problems surrounding access to EU markets for beef produced using hormones is the most
obvious issue. In the case of access to Canadian markets, the question of how foot-and-
mouth-free beef products newly available from South American countries, particularly
Argentina, are to be handled remains to be dealt with in an effective way. Further, new
issues such as animal welfare and biotechnology are coming to the forefront. These issues
require careful, well thought out trade positions prior to going forward to negotiations. Old
issues remain on the trade agenda and will also have to be dealt with—particularly dump-
ing, export subsidies, and technical barriers to trade. Thus, while all may appear on the sur-
face to be quiet, there is considerable work to be done in the near term. In fact, the quiet
times should not be wasted; it is often much easier to achieve trade objectives when things
are quiet than when they are in crisis.
The reason North American trade disputes are not prominent at the moment can be eas-
ily explained. While a similar story could be told for the pork industry, the situation in the
beef industry will be sufficient to illustrate the point. Figure 1, which shows the returns over
direct costs for U.S. cow-calf producers, is the most illustrative. The bottom line is that U.S.
cow-calf producers are making money. It is only when they are not making money that they
go looking for scapegoats for their poor returns. In the United States there is a tradition of
looking for foreign causes for poor economic conditions. Their “producer-friendly”
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that the U.S. Congress benefits from the existing system because it is able to deflect the
need to respond directly to those seeking protection, by suggesting that they seek redress in
contingency protection mechanisms.
The years of poor returns starting in the mid-1990s led to a group of disgruntled cow-
calf producers forming R-Calf and to that organization’s subsequent initiation of contin-
gency protection actions on dumping and subsidies. Requests for country-of-origin
labelling of beef also originated in this period. Previous periods of poor returns through the
1980s led to problems with border inspections, and antidumping and countervail actions
(Kerr et al., 1986). Over the last few years, however, returns have been positive for cow-
calf producers. As a result, R-calf dropped its appeals, and demands for mandatory labelling
of imported beef have been replaced by plans for a voluntary scheme. Of course, some
things work on a due process lag—witness the recent moves by USDA to revoke approval
for imported beef carcasses to receive USDA beef grades—something that was started in
the period of low returns.
Other players in the U.S. beef trade have also experienced strong prices over the last
few years. Figure 2 presents U.S. Choice Slaughter Steer prices (Texas Panhandle) since
1998—they show a steady upward trend although there was some weakening of prices in
the middle of 2000. At the packer level, for example, the U.S. Heavy Choice Rib Cutout
prices are well above historical averages (see figure 3). Further, Gross Packer Margins
appear to have reached a new, higher plateau since mid-1999 (see figure 4). Hence, it is
probably not surprising that things are relatively quiet on the U.S. beef cattle trade front.
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Figure 1 Average U. S. cow-calf returns
Source:  Sparks Co., Cattle and Beef Updates, Various Issues149
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Figure 2 U. S. Choice Slaughter Steers
Source:  Sparks Co., Cattle and Beef Updates, Various Issues
Figure 3 U. S. Heavy Choice Rib Cutout
Source:  Sparks Co., Cattle and Beef Updates, Various IssuesThe U.S. pork market is relatively flat with the pork herd continuing to shrink, albeit
slowly. The decline in herd size is being somewhat offset by strong growth in productivity
so that total supplies are only slightly reduced. The U.S. pork trade has remained relatively
constant although live imports of hogs from Canada in June and July 2000 were above 1999
levels.
Hence, while the current market conditions in North America are not likely to lead to a
major confrontation with the U.S. industry, it is well known that these industries cycle—one
only has to examine figure 1 again. This means that one can expect that prices and net
returns will deteriorate again in the future, and that when that happens trade problems will
increase. Hence, it is important to attempt to continue the private “bridge-building” activi-
ties with U.S. business groups and to work to improve the “rules of trade” for livestock
products.
What Can Be Done in the NAFTA ?
W
hile the NAFTA was instrumental in removing the formal barriers to trade in live-
stock between the United States and Canada, it has been less successful over a large
range of trade issues in the intervening years. The tariffs on livestock and meat were even
removed on a faster schedule than what was agreed in the NAFTA. The quantitative restric-
tions embedded in the meat import laws of both countries were also removed for U.S.-
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Figure 4 Gross Packer Margins
Source:  Sparks Co., Cattle and Beef Updates, Various IssuesCanadian trade (Kerr and Cullen, 1985). Trade in the red meat sector, however, was large-
ly free of formal trade barriers but a large number of non-tariff trade irritants existed in the
pre–Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement (CUSTA) era. A number of initiatives were included in
the CUSTA which attempted to address these trade irritants.
The most important of the trade irritants were U.S. contingency protection mecha-
nisms. In particular, prior to the signing of the CUSTA, the Canadian pork industry had
been subject to countervailing duties imposed by the United States. The original Canadian
position was that CUSTA partners would no longer be subject to the other country’s con-
tingency protection measures. When it became clear that this could not be attained at the
negotiations, Canada attempted to have mutually acceptable definitions enshrined in the
agreement, but all that could be agreed at the negotiations was a temporary arrangement
and an agreement to continue negotiations. Article 1907 of the CUSTA states:
The Parties shall establish a Working Group that shall:
(a) seek to develop more effective rules and disciplines concerning the use of
government subsidies;
(b) seek to develop a substitute system of rules for dealing with unfair pricing
and government subsidisation.
Further, in Article 106 it was agreed that:
The provisions of this Chapter shall be in effect for five years pending the devel-
opment of a substitute system of rules in both countries for antidumping and
countervailing duties as applied to their bilateral trade. If no such system of
rules is agreed and implemented at the end of five years the provisions of this
Chapter shall be extended for a further two years. Failure to agree and imple-
ment a new regime at the end of the two year extension shall allow either Party
to terminate the agreement on six months notice.
Thus, the Canadian red meat sector should have eventually received relief from its major
trade irritant. Buried in the fine print of the NAFTA, however, is a clause that removes the
seven-year deadline for arriving at new countervail and dumping definitions and proce-
dures (Gerber and Kerr, 1995). As a result, Canadian producers did not receive the relief
from U.S. contingency protection they expected from the agreement and the recent experi-
ence with the R-Calf suit shows that this remains a considerable problem. The NAFTA
appears closed to further negotiations.
Canadian beef packers had complained of what they considered capricious, if not
strategic, use of border inspections. According to Menzie and Prentice:
There are suspicions and some evidence, however, that these regulations have
been used to control movements beyond the legitimate levels (1987, p. 947).
It was agreed in the CUSTA that border inspections would be removed. They have, how-
ever, remained in place and have remained an irritant (Hayes and Kerr, 1997).
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States and Canada to make reforms where:
… to the greatest extent possible, … each Party shall make compatible its stan-
dards-related measures and procedures for product approval with those of the
other Party.
Since the signing of the NAFTA, Canada has unilaterally reformed its grading standards to
conform to U.S. standards. The USDA, however, has refused to grant equivalence for
Canadian grades, and the inability to grade product destined for export using the other
country’s grading system remains an inhibitor of trade (Hayes et al., 1995). Recent moves
by USDA to remove the ability of U.S. packers to apply U.S. grades to carcasses import-
ed from Canada suggests that there is little commitment to the removal of technical barri-
ers to trade in the United States. There are a number of commitments to consult with the
other party prior to changes in domestic regulations that would affect bilateral trade. Often,
there is a failure to consult when new sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations are being
developed (Hayes and Kerr, 1997).
ARecord of Understanding Between the Governments of Canada and the United States
Regarding the Area of Agricultural Trade (ROU) was signed in December of 1998. The
ROU involved a number of provisions that directly affect livestock trade. The most suc-
cessful of these—the Restricted Feeder Import Program (RFIP)—however, is a response to
evolving WTO rules that allow subnational health regions to be defined for trading pur-
poses (e.g., instead of an entire country having to be declared foot-and-mouth free before
exporting can take place, now subregions can be declared foot-and-mouth free and prod-
uct from the subareas exported). The RFIP facilitates the export of U.S. feeder cattle into
Canada. The ROU invited additional U.S. states to participate. Further, Canada has initiat-
ed a review of regulations governing the import of animals, with a focus on regionalisation
(i.e., allowing imports from some regions even though other regions of the United States
do not satisfy Canada’s health regulations for imports). The ROU also works towards
addressing inconsistencies between U.S. state and federal brucellosis and tuberculosis
requirements and an effort to co-operate with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. Based
on a scientific risk assessment, Canada modified its swine quarantine regulations to allow
swine for slaughter to be imported from states which are pseudorabies free.
The Restricted Feeder Import Program—formerly the Northwest Feeder Project—has
been a considerable success. It allows imports of feeder cattle from low risk areas for blue-
tongue and anaplasmosis in the United States. There has been a rapid expansion of imports,
from 51,000 head for the period from October 1998 to March 1999, to 175,000 head from
October 1999 to March 2000. This type of co-operation ties the Canadian and U.S. mar-
kets closer together and gives U.S. cow-calf producers a stake in an open border, and hope-
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Cornwell, the president-elect of the NCBA publicly state that
… I believe in trade. In fact the highest priced feeder cattle my family has ever
sold went last Friday to Alberta feeders (NCBA, August 29, 2000)
does far more to ensure the open border than any formal agreement. Further, the major beef
packers operating in western Canada are U.S.-owned and will not want their cattle supplies
jeopardised by Canadian retaliation—even unofficial tightening of red tape—for future
contingency protection harassment from U.S. producer groups.
There are proposals to expand the RFIP. The suggested changes include opening the
market to year-round imports of feeders. There would also be the delineation of U.S. zones
that are considered to have health standards equivalent to those in Canada. The proposals
would also allow movement of imported cattle among operations in Canada—to facilitate
backgrounding. The CCA has endorsed these changes and has been an active participant
in the process. As Young suggests:
Recognition of the degree of interdependence between the U.S. and Canadian
industries may motivate formulation of an industry group to pursue joint inter-
ests. These actions are likely to facilitate dispute avoidance (2000, p. 33).
There are limits, however, to cooperation. The NCBA has consistently pushed for
country-of-origin labelling for red meat. While this proposal may seem relatively innocu-
ous, it could carry considerable cost. While labelling final cuts of meat sold in supermar-
kets may be possible, labelling beef consumed in restaurants or ground beef (which is often
mixed) is not. Many U.S. firms may simply not wish to incur the costs associated with
labelling and may refuse to deal in Canadian beef. In this period of relatively good returns
in the U.S. beef industry, demands for mandatory labelling have been replaced by propos-
als for a voluntary labelling scheme. From the Canadian point of view this is an improve-
ment over mandatory labelling but its trade effects may not be insignificant. In any case,
one suspects that mandatory labelling will be back on the agenda when the industry re-
enters a low phase of the price cycle. While private co-operation may bring considerable
increased security of market access in some areas of North American red meat trade, it has
clear limits (Young, 2000). Increased liberalisation through NAFTA mechanisms, howev-
er, appears unlikely (Hayes and Kerr, 1997) and problems such as country-of-origin
labelling and antidumping measures will have to await resolution at the WTO. These ques-
tions are dealt with in more detail later in this paper. The NAFTAlooks increasingly like a
“one-time” liberalisation mechanism rather than a framework for ongoing progress toward
market integration, its original intent (Clement et al., 1997). While a wider round of WTO
negotiations remains stalled in the wake of the Seattle ministerial meetings in early 2000,
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progress may be made (Gaisford and Kerr, 2001).
The Agriculture Negotiations in Geneva
T
he Uruguay Round made the first tentative steps toward integrating trade in agricul-
tural products into general GATT disciplines. The negotiations were extremely acri-
monious and the round nearly faltered over agricultural issues. To secure a closure to the
Uruguay Round, the members agreed in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(AoA) that negotiations would continue after a respite (Gervais et al., 1999). While a wider
round was not agreed in Seattle, as mandated, talks on agriculture started in Geneva in the
spring of 2000. The topics open for negotiation, however, are limited to those of the AoA.
Unfortunately many of the issues important for red meat lie outside its purview (Kerr,
2000a). Still, some issues that are important for red meat trade are on the table.
In the AoA it was agreed that export subsidies would be reduced but not eliminated.
While ongoing reform of the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has
reduced the degree of export support required for the beef industry, considerable latitude
for the use of export subsidies remains. While the United States and the Cairns Group have
proposed that export subsidies be completely removed, it seems unlikely that the EU will
agree. A likely compromise is that there will be further reductions in export subsidies.
Obtaining commitments on the basis of individual commodities rather that allowing for
averaging subsidy reductions across a range of commodities would reduce the EU’s abili-
ty to disrupt international beef markets during a domestic market downturn.
Market access issues are also likely to be important during the negotiations. In partic-
ular, liberalisation of tariff quotas and their administration could become major points of
contention during negotiations. While Canada should continue to push for increased access
to the EU market through reform of the import regime for beef, realistically, any signifi-
cant movement of beef into the EU will have to await the resolution of the dispute sur-
rounding beef produced using growth hormones, as the import ban on this product repre-
sents the major impediment to market access. The question of tariff quotas is, however,
likely to come up in another context. Allowing disease-free subnational zones in the WTO
has made it possible for some South American countries, particularly Argentina, to begin
to ship foot-and-mouth-free chilled beef to markets that traditionally have been closed to
their products. The total quotas were set prior to the entry of the South American countries
into the fresh beef trade. While these countries are still experiencing some teething trou-
bles with their regional foot-and-mouth-free programs—witness Argentina’s voluntary
withdrawal from the North American fresh beef market in August 2000—it is expected that
they will have considerable export capacity in place in the near future. Hence, they will be
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the new international reality. Failing that, given their likely cost advantage they may also
wish to have the over-quota tariff reduced. The smaller the market access they are able to
obtain elsewhere through expansions in tariff quotas, the more cost competitive they will
become in the over-quota market. Negotiations on liberalisation of tariff quotas, namely
reductions in within-quota tariffs, over-quota tariffs, and the quota quantity, thus need to be
done carefully because they will be subject to the dynamics of the international beef mar-
ket (Gaisford and Kerr, 2001). If South American countries do not receive any concessions
on market access, they are likely to feel that the subregionalisation disease-free initiative
was a sham whereby they have expended considerable effort only to have their expected
increase in market access nullified by the tariff quota regime. This could lead to an inter-
esting case at the WTO relating to nullification or impairment of expected benefits.
Even if no concessions are granted on liberalisation of tariff quotas, South American
countries may wish to pursue the question of their administration. Not only was the total
quota set prior to the entry of South American countries into the foot-and-mouth-free fresh
beef trade, but the quota was also allocated among countries. In North America the lion’s
share of the quota went to the traditional suppliers of imported beef—Australia and New
Zealand. The United States has given Argentina a small quota—20,000 metric tons—while
in Canada, South American countries can compete for the portion of the quota not allocat-
ed to Australian and New Zealand suppliers. If the total quota cannot be expanded, then the
South American countries will press for a reapportioning of the quota. Australia and New
Zealand can be expected to lobby hard to retain their share of imports. Bureaucratic allo-
cations of import quotas will always lead to acrimony. The South American countries
might attempt to argue that the current tariff quota administration violates the basic WTO
principle of non-discrimination.
While the WTO does not make rules regarding quota allocation, the United States has
shown some interest in having the topic put on the table in the negotiations. The reason for
this is the low fill rates (the portion of the quota actually used for imports) in some coun-
tries. The U. S. hypothesises that tariff quota administration may, in part, explain why the
increase in its exports expected from the Uruguay Round has not been realised. Moving to
market-based allocation mechanisms, such as auctions, for tariff quotas would be within
the traditions of the WTO. Market-based mechanisms would allow the most efficient (low
cost) countries to acquire quota. The WTO’s preference for tariffs over quantitative restric-
tions as border instruments arose, in part, because tariffs ensure that the low cost country
will become the import supplier. This is particularly important when major changes are tak-
ing place, like the entry of South American countries into the international chilled beef
market. Moving to market-based tariff quota allocation systems through the WTO may also
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market where, one suspects, the United States is able to secure a larger proportion of some
countries’ beef or pork markets due to their economic power rather than their inherent
competitiveness. In any case, the arrival of South American chilled beef on the interna-
tional market requires careful study and evaluation for its effects on both the Canadian
domestic market and Canada’s offshore markets. While most of the South American out-
put remains grass fed, there is also investment in feedlots. The South American countries
are already planning aggressive marketing campaigns in the Asia-Pacific markets.
Canada has proposed zero-for-zero reductions in tariffs for trade in pork products. The
level of protection for pork in the EU is, compared to many agricultural products, relative-
ly low. It seems unlikely, however, that Japan would be interested in totally opening its
market and, hence, it may not be possible to achieve an agreement. Further, while China is
not yet a member of the WTO, if the agricultural negotiations are sufficiently protracted it
may well have acceded prior to a new agreement being reached. China has shown little
indication that it wishes to liberalise its pork market, although in its accession agreement
it has promised to put its pork import regime on a “scientific basis” and to reduce its tar-
iffs from 20 to 12 percent (Kerr, 2000b). These concessions were wrested from a China that
is desperate to join the WTO. Once it has become a member, further liberalisation in agri-
culture, particularly for meat products, is likely to become very difficult to achieve.
The last major item that may be on the table at the current talks in Geneva relates to
the issue of animal welfare. At the second special session of the Committee on Agriculture
in June 2000 the EU submitted a proposal on Animal Welfare and Trade in Agriculture.
Initial reactions to the EU’s ideas at the WTO’s ministerial meetings in Seattle were not
wholly favourable and the issue is likely to be the subject of intense bargaining. In the EU
there has been fierce lobbying by animal welfare groups for information regarding pro-
duction methods and for improved animal welfare in agricultural production. As a result,
the EU has adopted a parcel of legislation regarding the welfare of animals. Council
Directive 98/58/EC is the main law protecting animals kept for farming purposes; it lays
down standards for the conditions in which farm animals are kept and bred in member
states. Additional legislation exists regarding the protection of laying hens and veal calves.
The Treaty of Amsterdam also contains a protocol on the Protection and Welfare of
Animals. As a result, the EU has more stringent animal welfare regulations, and therefore
higher costs of production, than many of its trading partners. In its proposal to the
Committee on Agriculture, the EU states its concern that its animal welfare standards are
in danger of being undermined. The EU claims that without the provision of an appropri-
ate WTO framework, there is no way of ensuring that agricultural products produced to




Estey Centre Journal for Law and Economics in International Tra d eThe EU puts forward several ideas as to how the issue of animal welfare could be
addressed within the WTO. Their first suggestion is the creation of multilateral agreements
on the protection of animal welfare. It is unclear whether these agreements are intended to
be part of the WTO framework or outside of it. They do, however, state the need to clari-
fy the relationship between WTO rules and trade measures created by multilateral animal
welfare agreements. The second idea is for compulsory or voluntary labelling of products
produced in accordance with animal welfare standards. This would enable consumers to
make an informed choice, whether products are domestically produced or imported.
Finally, the EU proposes the provision of some kind of compensation to enable producers
to meet the additional costs of producing food to high animal welfare standards. This is
aimed at reducing disparities in competitiveness between countries with different stan-
dards. The EU states that these proposals are not mutually exclusive and that some combi-
nation of the three would be possible. They conclude their statement by reiterating their
aim to “address adequately the issue of animal welfare within the WTO, without conflict-
ing with the long-term objective of trade liberalisation in agricultural and food products”
(WTO, 2000, p. 3).
All of these proposals are likely to lead to reduced trade in livestock products. The
establishment of a separate international agreement on animal welfare opens the door for
rule making in trade to be moved into organisations whose motivations are not consistent
with trade liberalisation. An example of the types of results that arise when trade policy
making takes place outside of the WTO can be found in the recently negotiated BioSafety
Protocol. While the specific details are beyond the scope of this paper, it is sufficient to say
that the protocol contains clauses that are antipathetic to WTO principles, including allow-
ing for trade barriers to be put in place if domestic producers are adversely affected by
competition (Phillips and Kerr, 2000). The EU is correct in its observation that the rela-
tionship between a separate animal welfare protocol and the WTO needs to be clarified
before this can be a serious option. The WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment
has been attempting to sort out these jurisdictional questions with regard to multilateral
environmental agreements such as the BioSafety Protocol for years without success.
The proposal for labelling will lead to reduced trade and economic welfare as well as
an increase in exporting costs for those engaged in international commerce (see Gaisford
and Lau, 2000, for a discussion of labelling in the context of trade in genetically modified
organisms). The proposal to allow for compensation—read subsidies—can be interpreted
as an attempt to bring production subsidies in through the back door. It seems clear that the
additional costs associated with higher animal welfare standards are no different than the
higher costs imposed by any form of domestically imposed standards (i.e., labour stan-
dards, environmental standards, etc.). The WTO has always treated these as part of the gen-
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riers or trade-distorting subsidies. This proposal should be vigorously opposed. The con-
sumer’s right to know which is embodied in the labelling issue is probably better dealt with
in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade rather than in a new AoA. This question
is dealt with in the following section.
Issues for a New Broad Round of WTO Negotiations
T
he major issues that pertain to the liberalisation of trade in livestock lie outside the
AoA and its renewed negotiations. Unfortunately, these areas are those that would be
encompassed in a new, broad round of WTO talks. The members could not agree on a
Millennium Round at the Seattle ministerial meetings, and hence it remains in abeyance.
Even if a round can be agreed to after the changeover in the U.S. Administration, the issues
that concern trade in red meat and livestock—and these products are not the focus of dis-
agreements among the parties—are likely to be some of the most acrimonious to be dealt
with at the negotiations. Three areas are particularly important: (1) dumping, (2) sanitary
measures, and (3) technical barriers to trade.
As suggested in the discussion of the NAFTA, it would be of considerable benefit to
the Canadian livestock industry if it could be better protected from the capricious use of
antidumping duties by the United States. In particular, the “selling below cost” definition
needs to be removed as a sole criterion for the imposition of antidumping duties. While the
intent of this definition relates to predatory pricing, the definition cannot be used in isola-
tion. Hog and beef producers operate in a relatively competitive market—meaning they
cannot sell below cost to capture a market because there is no high-priced domestic mar-
ket that can be used to cross-subsidise sales below cost in the foreign market. Livestock
markets cycle, which means that producers lose money in certain periods. Given the inte-
grated North American livestock markets, producers on both sides of the border are likely
to be losing money—selling below cost—at the same time. Being charged with dumping
when U.S. firms are following the same business practice has been particularly galling for
Canadian producers.
At a minimum, the livestock industry in Canada would like to have the dumping def-
inition changed so that selling below cost and international price discrimination must be
taking place simultaneously before a firm can be accused of dumping. While even these
dual criteria are not sufficient to define predatory pricing, their use would prevent cases
like the one brought by R-Calf from being brought forward.
The other problem with dumping cases is that they impose considerable costs on those
who seek to protect themselves by engaging in a defence of their position. As a result,
antidumping actions can be used as a means to harass foreign firms. As the R-Calf case
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exporters. While proof of injury is required before permanent antidumping duties can be
imposed, temporary antidumping duties are often sufficient for the purposes of harassment.
An ex ante de minimis requirement might be proposed as an additional criterion. This pro-
vision would require that the de minimis threshold be exceeded before temporary duties
could be imposed. Pushing for a high de minimis level in the WTO dumping disciplines
may be the easiest way to reduce the harassment costs of U.S. antidumping actions.
The United States can be expected to fiercely contest any changes to antidumping
codes. This is because the Congress finds antidumping actions a convenient method of
diverting protectionist pressure. As a result, they will resist any movement to have dump-
ing handled through international competitions policy or to replace it with safeguard pro-
visions. Thus, asking for the changes suggested above may be the only method to move
forward. One way to increase pressure on the United States to agree to antidumping
reforms would be for other countries to make greater use of antidumping actions against
the United States. In the North American livestock industries, if Canadian exporters are
selling below cost in the United States there is a good chance that U.S. exporters are sell-
ing below cost in Canada. Thus, a dumping case could be made against the United States.
The Canadian industry has not wished to pursue this avenue because it fears the loss of the
relationship it has built up with its U.S. counterparts. It might be time to rethink this strat-
egy. Admittedly, a change in strategy carries considerable risks. In any case, getting the
United States to agree to alter its dumping regime will be extremely difficult at the WTO.
The European Union’s ban on the import of beef produced using growth hormones
remains the most serious constraint on livestock trade. During the Uruguay Round, a new
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures (SPS) was negoti-
ated. Its central theme was to ensure that trade barriers put in place on human, animal, and
plant health grounds had a scientific basis. One of the new agreement’s first tests was the
long-standing beef hormone dispute between the European Union on one side and Canada
and the United States on the other. The EU bans the use of beef hormones domestically and
also prohibits the import of beef products produced using these growth promoters. With the
SPS in place as well as the new arbitration-based dispute settlement system, Canada and
the United States mounted a challenge to the EU ban. The details of the case have been
well documented elsewhere (see Roberts, 1998). The EU lost the case. It attempted to win
its case largely on the basis of technicalities because it was clear that its ban did not have
a solid scientific basis.
The EU, however, decided not to comply with the WTO dispute panel ruling and,
instead, chose to accept retaliation as is its right (Kerr and Perdikis, 1995). Retaliation is a
second-best policy because it does not assist the cattle industry in Canada and the United
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retaliation is taking place. While legally it is possible to accept retaliation and breach WTO
commitments, these occurrences are rare and usually indicate that the political consensus
that underlies the WTO has broken down. When this happens it usually signals that rene-
gotiation at the WTO is necessary. The EU has made it clear that it wishes to renegotiate
the SPS to include consumers’ concerns.
Renegotiation of the SPS should be resisted by Canada. The hormone case proves that
the SPS is working as intended—to prevent the capricious use of bogus health regulations
to protect producers. Having the SPS is important for the future functioning of trade in red
meat products (Kerr and Hobbs, 2000).
It also needs to be recognised that the problem the EU faced was not producers asking
for protection, but consumers. The WTO and its progenitor, The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were established with only one source of protectionism in
mind—producers. The EU, however, was faced with strong pressure from consumers to
ban the use of growth hormones (Roberts, 1998). This does not mean that once EU beef
producers were denied the use of a productivity-enhancing technology available to their
North American competitors they did not seek protection; nor did it mean that the reduced
productivity of the ban did not assist with the management of the EU beef regime—it did.
The primary motive behind the ban, however, was consumer pressure. The EU was forced
to attempt to defend its import regime on SPS grounds because it had no other mechanism
available. Increasingly, however, consumers and other groups are asking for protection
from imports. The most obvious instance is consumer and environmental groups’demands
for protection from genetically modified foods and organisms, but in affluent societies con-
sumers have also been taking increasing interest in a broad spectrum of issues that have
trade ramifications—animal welfare, leghold traps, child labour standards, tuna fishing
methods, and whaling, to name several. The WTO has no mechanism to deal with these
requests for protection and, to a considerable degree, the confrontations with civil society
groups at the Seattle ministerial meetings were centred on these issues.
Instead of focusing on renegotiating existing WTO agreements, which are motivated
by restraining governments’ abilities to extend protection to producers, a better strategy
may be to deal with consumers’ (and other groups’) demands for protection head on. In a
new agreement there could be a chance to alter the existing rules, or at least their empha-
sis. In the existing WTO structure both compensation and accepting retaliation are options
for countries that decide to ignore their WTO commitments. As compensation entails a
gross cost while retaliation is a net cost, countries seldom choose to offer compensation
and instead opt for the cheaper acceptance of retaliation. Acentral point of any new agree-
ment on the imposition of trade barriers for reasons of consumers’ preferences could be
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barriers, then compensation would be the only method of recompense. Further, it should be
monetary compensation rather than the offering of alternative trade concessions. In that
way, the injured industry in the exporting country would be directly compensated for the
loss in markets suffered. This is superior to retaliation, which does nothing for the injured
industry and distorts trade in other sectors. It also raises the political cost of raising trade
barriers and will thus help curtail their use. Clearly, moving to a compensation system
would be a radical departure from current WTO practice and would not be without imple-
mentation difficulties (Perdikis and Kerr, 1999). Unfortunately, livestock concerns relating
to issues such as growth hormones are bundled with extremely complex and emotive issues
like biotechnology, child labour, and environmental standards and, hence, achieving a set-
tlement in the near term seems remote.
The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade needs to be strengthened if the
red meat industry is to be better protected from regulations such as country-of-origin
labelling requirements. Currently, technical barriers must have a legitimate purpose.
Further, the TBT states that the “costs of implementing the standard must be proportional
to the purpose of the standard”. The intent of this statement is that the benefits received by
consumers from the standard should not exceed the costs to exporters of implementing the
standard. The existing wording, however, is considered too imprecise to allow a judgement
against country-of-origin labelling. The wording needs to be made much more explicit if
Canadian red meat producers are to receive increased protection from the capricious use of
labelling. Something like “the costs of implementing the standard must not exceed the ben-
efits received by consumers” would be an improvement. Of course, such wording would
lead to a great deal of work for economists in preparing and refuting cost-benefit studies
but these are technical matters upon which WTO panels could judge. Again, however,
achieving this degree of definitional preciseness would be extremely difficult at the nego-
tiations.
C o n c l u s i o n s
F
urther trade liberalisation in livestock and red meat appears to be at a difficult stage.
Many of the central issues lie outside the traditional areas of liberalisation and instead
involve deepening of economic integration in areas of domestic regulations and standards.
The NAFTA, which was originally touted as an instrument for deepening economic inte-
gration through harmonisation and removal of non-tariff barriers, appears to be stalled.
While there have been some initiatives to liberalise trade in livestock between Canada and
the United States since the signing of the NAFTA, such as the Restricted Feeder Import
Program, they have been achieved largely outside the NAFTA mechanisms. Private initia-
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be an important part of keeping North American borders open.
Given that the NAFTA does not appear to be a vehicle for further trade liberalisation,
focus must move to the WTO. While talks are currently taking place on the issues con-
tained in the AoA, they are not central to red meat trade liberalisation. If it is achieved at
all, further liberalisation will have to await a broad negotiating round. The issues that must
be tackled there are, however, extremely complex.
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1.  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Canadian Agri-Food Trade
Research Network Workshop on Agricultural Trade Liberalization: Can We Make
Progress? Quebec City, Quebec, October 2000.
162
W.A. Kerr
Estey Centre Journal for Law and Economics in International Tra d eR e f e r e n c e s
Clement, N.C., del Castillo Vera, G., Gerber, J., Kerr, W. A., MacFayden, A. J., Shedd, S.
Zepeda, E. and Alarcon, D. (1997) North American Economic Integration, Edward
Elgar, Cheltenham.
Gaisford, J. D. and Kerr, W.A. (2001) Economic Analysis for Trade Negotiations,
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Gaisford, J. D and Lau, C. H. C. (2000) The Case For and Against Import Embargoes on
Products of Biotechnology, The Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade
Policy, 1 (1): 83-98, http://www.esteyjournal.com.
Gerber, J. and Kerr, W.A. (1995) Trade as an Agency of Social Policy: NAFTA’s
Schizophrenic Role in Agriculture, in Randall. S. J. and Konrad, H. (eds.) NAFTA in
Transition, University of Calgary Press. Calgary: 93-111.
Gervais, J-P, Huff, K., Kerr, W. A., Meilke, K., Phillips, P., Rude, J. and St. Louis, R.
(1999) A Guide to the Seattle Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations on
Agriculture, Canadian Agri-food Trade Research Network, web publication at:
(http://www.eru.ulaval.ca/catrn/primer.htm).
Hayes, D. J., Hayenga, M. I. And Melton, B.E. (1995) The Impact of Grade Equivalency
of Beef and Cattle Trade Between the United States and Canada, U.S. Meat Export
Analysis and Trade News, 13 (12).
Hayes, D. J. and Kerr, W.A. (1997) Progress Toward a Single Market: The New
Institutional Economics of the NAFTA Livestock Sectors, in Loyns, R. M. A.,
Knutson, R. D., Meilke, K. and Sumner, D. A. (eds),
Harmonization/Convergence/Compatibility in Agriculture and Agri-Food Policy:
Canada, United States, Mexico, University of Manitoba, Texas A and M University,
University of Guelph, University of California-Davis, Winnipeg: 163-180.
Kerr, W.A. (2000a) The Next Step Will be Harder: Issues for the New Round of
Agricultural Negotiations at the World Trade Organisation, Journal of World Trade,
34 (1): 123-140.
Kerr, W.A. (2000b) Enter the Dragon: China’s Accession to the WTO, CATRN Paper
2000-04, Canadian Agrifood Trade Research Network,
http://www.eru.ulaval.ca/catrn/China.pdf.
Kerr, W.A. and Cullen, S. E. (1985) Canada-US Free Trade – Implications for the
Western Canadian Livestock Industry, Western Economic Review, 4 (3): 24-36.
Kerr, W.A., Cullen, S. E. and Sommerville, M. F. (1986) Trade Barriers and the Western
Canadian Livestock Industry, Working Paper 11/86, Marketing and Economics
Branch, Agriculture Canada.
Kerr, W.A. and Hobbs, J. E. (2000) The WTO and the Dispute Over Beef Produced
Using Growth Hormones, CATRN Paper 2000-07, Canadian Agrifood Trade
Research Network, http://www.eru.ulaval.ca/catrn/beef.pdf.




Estey Centre Journal for Law and Economics in International Tra d eMenzie, E.I. and Prentice, B.E. (1987) Formal and Informal Barriers to Trade in
Agricultural Products, Canada-United States, American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, 69 (5): 946-951.
National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA) (2000) NCBA President-Elect Responds
to R-Calf, August 29, 2000, http://www.beef.org/newsroom/ncba/ncba00_0829a.htm.
Perdikis, N. and Kerr, W. A. (1999) Can Consumer-Based Demands for Protection be
Incorporated in the WTO? – The Case Of Genetically Modified Foods, Canadian
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 47 (4): 457-465.
Phillips, P.W.B. and Kerr, W.A. (2000) The BioSafety Protocol and International Trade
in Genetically Modified Organisms, CATRN Paper 2000-03, Canadian Agrifood
Trade Research Network, http://www.eru.ulaval.ca/catrn/protocol.pdf.
Roberts, D. (1998) Preliminary Assessment of the Effects of the WTO Agreement on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Trade Regulations, Journal of International Economic
Law: 377-405.
World Trade Organisation (WTO) (2000) European Communities Proposal: Animal
Welfare and Trade in Agriculture document G/AG/NG/W/19, 28 June at
(http://www.wto.org/english/trtope/agric_e/negoi_e.htm).
Young, L. M. (2000) U.S.-Canadian Agricultural Trade Conflicts: Time for a New




Estey Centre Journal for Law and Economics in International Tra d e
The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and not those of the Estey
Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy nor the Estey Centre for Law and
Economics in International Trade. © The Estey Centre for Law and Economics in
International Trade.